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I. INTRODUCTION
Although corporate representative depositions' are a common discovery
tool in litigation, there are surprisingly few reported decisions discussing
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1. Both the federal and state rules are equally applicable to other organizations, includ-
ing partnerships, governmental entities, and associations. See, e.g., Anderson Invs. Co. v.
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their scope and parameters, especially from Florida's state courts. Most of
these reported decisions involve the location of such depositions2 rather than
the scope of permissible inquiry. Therefore, while the use of corporate rep-
resentative depositions gives rise to many important legal questions, there are
very few reported answers. This article will focus on some of the more im-
portant issues presented by these depositions, the manner in which they have
been treated, and the proposed answers to those issues which are presently
unresolved.
II. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE INQUIRY
Although differing slightly in their wording, the substance of both Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) 3 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.310(b)(6) 4 are the same. Both rules essentially provide that a party wanting
to depose a corporation or other organization may do so through the use of a
notice, which designates the proposed areas of inquiry with reasonable parti-
Lynch, 540 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam). Nevertheless, for
grammatical ease, this article will generally refer to depositions under these rules as corporate
representative depositions.
2. See, e.g., Prevost Car, Inc. v. Vehicles-R-Us, Inc., 658 So. 2d 668, 668 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that absent extraordinary circumstances, a non-resident employee of a
foreign corporation, which is not seeking affirmative relief, cannot be compelled to come to
Florida for deposition). In one case, the court became so flabbergasted over the parties' pro-
tracted dispute over the location of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that it ordered the parties to
engage in a "game of 'rock, paper, scissors."' Avista Mgmt., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters
Ins. Co., No. 6:05-CV1430ORL31JGG, 2006 WL 1562246, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006).
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) provides:
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a
partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with rea-
sonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate
one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testi-
fy. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation. The
persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organ-
ization. This paragraph (6) does not preclude a deposition by any other procedure allowed by
these rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
4. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6) provides:
In the notice a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership or
association, or a governmental agency, and designate with reasonable particularity the matters
on which examination is requested. The organization so named shall designate one or more of-
ficers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to do so, to testify on its
behalf and may state the matters on which each person designated will testify. The persons so
designated shall testify about matters known or reasonably available to the organization. This
subdivision does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these
rules.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10(b)(6).
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cularity.5 In response, the corporation or organization selects one or more
individuals with knowledge of the matters listed who will testify on behalf of
the corporate entity.6 Since the Florida rule was patterned after the then-
existing federal rule, Florida courts have often relied on interpretations of the
corresponding federal rule.7
A. Is Inquiry Limited to the Specific Identified Areas on the Notice?
One of the first issues, which regularly arises during the taking of many
corporate representative depositions, is whether the questioning party is li-
mited in its interrogation of the witness to the specific matters identified in
the notice or whether it can go beyond these areas. Surprisingly, there are no
Florida state appellate opinions which even address this issue and only a
handful of reported federal district court cases.8
The first reported decision to consider this issue was the 1985 Massa-
chusetts' federal district court opinion in Paparelli v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America,9 which involved a products liability claim for injuries alle-
gedly sustained as a result of the defective operation of an elevator. 1° In Pa-
parelli, plaintiffs counsel admittedly questioned defendant's corporate rep-
resentative on matters outside of the areas designated on the deposition no-
tice. 1 Defense counsel responded by instructing his "witness not to answer
the questions," which in turn prompted a motion for sanctions.'
2
The court began its inquiry by observing that there was nothing in either
the wording of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b) or the accompanying
5. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6).
6. United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
"Obviously it is not literally possible to take the deposition of a corporation; instead, when a
corporation is involved, the information sought must be obtained from natural persons who can
speak for the corporation." The corporation appears vicariously through it designee.... [The]
designee does not give his personal opinions. Rather, he presents the corporation's "position"
on the topic.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Plantation-Simon, Inc. v. Bahloul, 596 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Harris v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Civ. No. 03-2002 (RBK), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61457, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2007).
9. 108 F.R.D. 727 (D. Mass. 1985).
10. See id. at 728.
11. Id. at 729.
12. Id. at 728-29. Although concluding that the questioning was not appropriate, the
court nevertheless further held that defense counsel had improperly instructed his client not to
answer the questions, since they did not involve a claim of privilege. Id. at 731. The court,
however, ultimately declined to impose sanctions concluding that both counsel had been at
fault. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 731.
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Advisory Committee notes, which expressly limited inquiry to the designated
areas. 13 Despite this lack of express restrictions, the court reasoned that in-
quiry was nevertheless limited to the stated areas for a number of reasons. 4
It began its analysis with the conclusion that:
It makes no sense for a party to state in a notice that it wishes to
examine a representative of a corporation on certain matters, have
the corporation designate the person most knowledgeable with re-
spect to those matters, and then to ask the representative about
matters totally different from the ones listed in the notice.'5
The court then went on to note that prior to the adoption of the rule, a
corporation often had no idea of the potential areas of inquiry when a specif-
ic named corporate employee or officer was noticed. 6 Often, the specifically
named individual had no relevant knowledge regarding the matter. 7 Accor-
dingly, one of the purposes behind the adoption of the rule was to allow the
corporation to determine which of its employees or officers had knowledge
of the matters sought to be discovered, to select someone with such know-
ledge, and to prepare them for the deposition. 8 Therefore, the court ex-
pressed concern that the:
[P]urpose of the rule would be effectively thwarted if a party could
ask a representative of a corporation produced pursuant to a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition notice to testify as to matters which [were] to-
tally unrelated to the matters listed in the notice and upon which
the representative is prepared to testify.
1 9
Finally, although noting the absence of an express limitation upon ques-
tioning in the rule itself, the court nevertheless concluded that the language
of the rule implicitly supported such a restriction by stating:
[T]he fact that the notice must list the matters upon which exami-
nation is requested "with reasonable particularity" also lends
weight to the notion that a limitation on the scope of the deposition
to the matters specified in the notice is implied in the rule. If a
party were free to ask any questions, even if "relevant" to the law-
13. Id. at 729; see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
14. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 729-30.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 730.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 729-30.
19. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 730.
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suit, which were completely outside the scope of the "matters on
which examination is requested," the requirement that the matters
be listed "with reasonable particularity" would make no sense.
With this in mind, the sentence which reads that "[t]he persons so
designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available
to the organization" can be read in harmony with the rest of the
rule if the word "matters" has the same meaning as it does when
used earlier in the rule, i.e. "matters upon which examination is re-
quested." As to "matters upon which examination is requested,"
the representative has the duty to answer questions on behalf of the
organization to the extent that the information sought is "known to
the organization or reasonably available to it."
20
The opposite conclusion was reached ten years later, however, by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in King v.
Pratt & Whitney (King J).21 Looking at the rule as being designed to provide
an additional discovery tool, this court concluded that while it imposed an
affirmative duty on the corporation to select an individual with knowledge of
the designated areas, it did not "confer some special privilege on a corporate
deponent," which would allow it to avoid answering questions of which it
had knowledge, just because they were outside the scope of the deposition
notice.22 The court further reasoned that, even if the inquiry had been in-
tended to be limited by Rule 30(b)(6) to the designated areas, the party taking
the deposition could simply re-notice the witness' deposition as an individual
and cover the new areas.23 Accordingly, the court concluded that the party
seeking the deposition "should not be forced to jump through that extra hoop
absent some compelling reason. 24
20. Id. But cf Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that a
30(b)(6) notice may not contain topics broadened by the phrase including but not limited to);
Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005) (striking
"including but not limited to" from the categories in the 30(b)(6) notice).
21. 161 F.R.D. 475,476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
The decision of the court is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
appearing in the Federal Reporter. The Eleventh Circuit provides by rule that unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent [but] may be cited as persuasive authority, pro-
vided that a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached to or incorporated within the brief, pe-
tition or motion.
King v. Pratt & Whitney (King I), 213 F.3d 647, 647 (11th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision) (citing 11TH Ct. R. 36-2).
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The district court's decision was subsequently affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished memorandum decision,2 5 which
under the court's rules constitutes only persuasive and not binding authori-
ty. 26 This case has since been followed by several other more recent district
court decisions.27
Therefore, one line of federal cases views Rule 30(b)(6) as designed to
provide additional protection to corporations having to select representatives
and accordingly limits the inquiry to the designated areas.28 The other line,
however, looks at Rule 30(b)(6) as providing parties with additional discov-
ery tools and as a result does not limit the inquiry.29 Although more federal
district court decisions follow the latter approach, the minuscule number of
total cases coupled with the lack of binding circuit court authority clearly
fails to constitute a definitive federal rule.30
The rule limiting the inquiry to the designated matters makes more
sense from both a legal and logical standpoint, although the Paparelli court
fails to address many of the reasons supporting this conclusion.3' As dis-
cussed in more detail below, there are distinct differences between the per-
mitted uses of corporate representative depositions as opposed to those in-
volving normal witnesses.32
A corporate representative deposition is a party deposition and accor-
dingly, is not limited by the normal rules regarding witness depositions.33 As
25. King II, 213 F.3d at 647.
26. Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2, a decision of the court referenced in a Table of
Decisions Without Reported Opinions appearing in the Federal Reporter is "not considered
binding precedent, but . . . may be cited as persuasive authority .... [provided that] a copy of
the unpublished opinion [is] attached to or incorporated within the" pleading. 11TH CIR. R.
36-2.
27. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. Yamulla Enters., Inc., 194 F.R.D. 499, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000);
Detoy v. City & County of S.F., 196 F.R.D. 362, 367 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Overseas Private Inv.
Corp. v. Mandelbaum, 185 F.R.D. 67, 68 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Teknowledge Corp. v.
Akamai Techs., Inc., No. C 02-5741-SI, 2004 WL 2480707, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004).
28. See, e.g., Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 730 (D. Mass.
1985).
29. See, e.g., Cabot Corp., 194 F.R.D. at 499; Detoy, 196 F.R.D. at 367; Mandelbaum,
185 F.R.D. at 68.
30. See Wylie v. Inv. Mgmt. & Resource, Inc., 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (en banc). "When a state appellate court is asked to decide a federal question as to
which there is no Supreme Court authority directly on point, and the Circuit Courts of Appeal
are divided, there is no [definitive] rule to guide such a state court." Id. In such cases, state
courts engage in a reverse Erie analysis and "guess how the highest court is likely to decide
the issue." Id.
31. See Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 729-30.
32. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(1)-(2).
33. See id. 1.330(a)(2).
[Vol. 33
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such, under both the federal and state rules the deposition may be used at
trial "for any purpose,"34 which means it may be read at trial regardless of the
availability of the witness and offered as substantive evidence. 35 The witness
may also be led on direct examination 36 and admissions made by a corporate
representative are binding on the corporation,37 while the same statements
made by a normal employee, even if a high-ranking one, are not binding.38
As discussed in more detail below, while most courts have not considered
such admissions "conclusive" in the same sense as "judicial admissions,"
they are nevertheless given tremendous weight when compared to the testi-
mony of a normal witness.39
Courts have also been more liberal in allowing the questioning of party
witnesses as opposed to independent ones, especially where the party has
some special expertise, such as a physician.' In such cases, opinion testimo-
ny has often been allowed.41
Although the testimony of the corporate representative in a deposition
as to designated matters is binding on the corporation, the deponent's know-
ledge as to other matters outside the designations in the deposition is not.42
Therefore, if a court is going to permit a corporate representative to be ques-
tioned on outside matters, at the very least, it must weigh the different por-
tions of the deposition testimony separately to determine each one's admissi-
bility and weight.43 If the testimony outside of the designated areas is still
admissible so that it may be read or shown to the jury, this will present a very
confusing situation for the jury, which is unlikely to be cured by a jury in-
struction. Essentially, the jury would be required to give different parts of
the same deposition different weight or consideration, which presents a high-
ly technical and unrealistic situation for the jury.'
34. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3), with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(2).
35. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90-C-5383, 1991 WL 211647, at *2 (N.D.
11. Oct. 15, 1991) (citing Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1046 (7th Cir. 1974)); La-
Torre v. First Baptist Church of Ojus, Inc., 498 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 90.612(3) (2008).
37. Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
38. See Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 65 (D.P.R. 1981).
39. See discussion infra Section V.B.
40. See, e.g., Weyant v. Rawlings, 389 So. 2d 710, 711-12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 220 A.2d 693, 698-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
41. See, e.g., Weyant, 389 So. 2d at 712.
42. See, e.g., McLellan Highway Corp. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.
Mass. 2000) (excluding testimony outside of the designated areas).
43. See, e.g., id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 359 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(recognizing that not all discoverable matters are "necessarily admissible at trial" in dealing
with the scope of corporate representative depositions).
44. See McLellan, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
2009]
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Therefore, while a party could simply re-notice the deposition of the
corporate representative in order to take a subsequent deposition as a fact
witness with reference to matters outside the notice, this is not a mere techni-
cality as suggested by the court in King I, because of the differences between
the uses and permissible manner of inquiry between the two types of deposi-
tions.45
B. When Does Inquiry Violate a Corporation's Work Product Privi-
lege ?
Another common issue, which has surprisingly received no attention by
the Florida state courts, is the question of when inquiry of a corporate repre-
sentative violates the work product privilege. A notice of corporate repre-
sentative deposition will often contain designations such as "all of the issues
raised by plaintiff's complaint" or "the facts of the accident," which impli-
cate several work product issues.
First, designations like "all of the issues raised by plaintiffs complaint"
require the corporation's counsel to exercise its legal discretion in defining
the relevant issues in the case in order to even identify the appropriate repre-
sentative. Such designations are conceptually no different than requests "to
produce 'all documents that relate to or otherwise support' each essential
allegation in the . . . complaint," or to designate all documents selected by
counsel and given to his client to review in preparation for deposition, which
have been held to constitute work product. 46 At least one federal court has
found that while "the facts of a relevant incident... are proper for a 30(b)(6)
inquiry, the contentions, i.e. [the] theories and legal positions, of an organiza-
tional party may be more suitably explored by way of interrogatories. 47
Another work product issue arises when the designated witness does not
have actual knowledge of the areas of inquiry, but instead only has informa-
tion supplied by the corporation's legal counsel. An example of this type of
problem typically occurs in a personal injury case, where the notice deli-
neates issues relating to the occurrence of the underlying accident, such as
"how the accident occurred," "the facts giving rise to the plaintiff's compara-
tive negligence," and so on. If the corporate employees actually involved in
the accident are not available for deposition, reside outside the jurisdiction,
are no longer employed, or did not personally witness the facts underlying
45. See King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D. 475,476 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
46. Gabriel v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 890 So. 2d 517, 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005), overruled by Grinnell Corp. v. Palms 2100 Ocean Blvd., Ltd., 924 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985).
47. Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 529 n.8 (D. Md. 2005).
[Vol. 33
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the designated issues, the corporation will be forced to select a representative
without actual first hand knowledge, such as an adjuster, whose information
was provided by the company's counsel as a result of discovery and its case
investigation.a"
This situation presents a potential clash between the application of the
work product doctrine and the provisions of both the state and federal rules,
which require the representative to testify as to the matters that are known or
reasonably available to the corporation.49 Normally, information developed
by a party's attorney in preparation of the case would be privileged as work
product.5° Under Florida law, this protection cannot be circumvented by
asking a recipient of the information to set forth his or her "observations"
regarding the subject matter of the privileged information, when the observa-
tions are based upon privileged information.5" Such an inquiry is also not so
different from the type prohibited in ICI Explosives USA Inc. v. Douglas,2
where the court held that plaintiffs' counsel could not ask the defendant cor-
poration's safety director the content of witnesses' statements told to him
during the course of his work product investigation or to set forth the corpo-
ration's contentions regarding the cause of the accident giving rise to the
suit. 53 Some federal courts have reached the same conclusion, holding that
the work product privilege applies to prevent the questioning of corporate
employees as to privileged matters relayed to them by the corporation's at-
torneys5 4
At least one federal court has held that the work product doctrine cannot
be used as a shield from preparing witnesses for their 30(b)(6) depositions:
While counsel's own investigation into the facts of the case is sub-
stantially protected by the [work product] doctrine, and while the
proceedings of any investigation conducted for purposes of risk as-
sessment or peer review may be privileged by reason of the Mary-
land statute, the fact remains that a designated witness or witnesses
must still be prepared to respond to the 30(b)(6) notice. If that
48. See, e.g., id. at 530.
49. See id. at 528-29.
50. Huet v. Tromp, 912 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that in-
formation provided to an adjuster by the defendant's attorneys is normally protected from
disclosure as work product); Alachua Gen. Hosp. v. Zimmer USA, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1087,
1088 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
51. Huet, 912 So. 2d at 341.
52. 643 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
53. See id. at 708.
54. See SEC v. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. 441, 444 (N.D. II1. 2003); SEC v. Rosenfeld, No.
97 CIV. 1467 (RPP), 1997 WL 576021, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997); SEC v. Morelli, 143
F.R.D. 42, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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preparation means tracking much the same investigative ground
that counsel and the risk management/peer review committee have
already traversed, but independently of that investigation, so be it.
Defense counsel may wish to exercise caution in preparing the
witness or witnesses with privileged documents--otherwise the
privilege may be waived as to those documents-but it is simply
no answer to a 30(b)(6) deposition notice to claim that relevant
documents or investigations are privileged and that therefore no
knowledgeable witness can be produced.
On the other hand, the federal decisions in particular have made it clear
that the corporation has a duty to provide a representative with information
that is "known or reasonably available" to it.56 As subsequently discussed in
more detail,57 the corporation is therefore charged with the responsibility of
preparing the witness to fully and completely answer questions reasonably
related to the designated areas.5" Some have gone so far as to say the repre-
sentative must be prepared to testify about not only the corporation's know-
ledge, but "its subjective beliefs and opinions."59
A number of federal cases have tried to draw the line between the obli-
gation to prepare the corporate representative and the right to avoid disclos-
ing privileged matters. 60 These courts have concluded that where "the notice
seeks, if not the deposition of opposing counsel, then the practical equivalent
thereof. Courts... have generally taken a critical view of such a tactic. 61
Accordingly, in SEC v. Morelli,62 the court quashed the defendant's no-
tice of deposition and directed it to instead propound contention interrogato-
ries:
[T]he Court finds that the proposed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition con-
stitutes an impermissible attempt by defendant to inquire into the
mental processes and strategies of the SEC. Given plaintiffs
55. Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Md. 2005) (footnotes omitted).
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.310(b)(E)(6); see also United States v.
Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 360 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164
F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995).
57. See infra Section IV.B., "The Knowledge Base of the Representative(s)."
58. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 360; Dravo, 164 F.R.D. at 75.
59. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361. For further discussion see infra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
60. See generally SEC v. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. 11. 2003); SEC v. Rosenfeld,
No. 97 CIV. 1467 (RPP), 1997 WL 576021, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997); SEC v. Morelli,
143 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
61. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. at 445.
62. 143 F.R.D. at 42.
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sworn, uncontroverted statement that all relevant, non-privileged
evidence has been disclosed to the defendants, the Court is drawn
inexorably to the conclusion that [defendant's] Notice of Deposi-
tion is intended to ascertain how the SEC intends to marshall the
facts, documents and testimony in its possession, and to discover
the inferences that plaintiff believes properly can be drawn from
the evidence it has accumulated.
Despite this result, [defendant] is not precluded from all inqui-
ri[es] into the contentions of the SEC.... [Contention interrogato-
ries] represent[] an appropriate method for [defendant] to inquire
into the SEC's contentions.63
In SEC v. Buntrock,64 the court noted the potential for conflict between
the case law requiring a party to properly prepare a witness to answer ques-
tions outside its own personal knowledge and the party's work product privi-
lege:
Buntrock claims that it does not seek to depose opposing counsel,
arguing that the SEC may designate any person under the rule.
While this contention may be technically true, from a practical
standpoint it is an unconvincing argument. The rule requires that
the responding party make a conscientious good faith effort to de-
signate the persons having knowledge of the matters sought by the
[discovering party] and to prepare those persons in order that they
can answer fully, completely, unevasively, the questions posed by
the [discovering party] as to the relevant subject matters. The in-
vestigation in this matter was conducted by SEC attorneys and by
SEC employees working under the direction of attorneys. Thus,
the 30(b)(6) notice would necessarily involve the testimony of at-
torneys assigned to this case, or require those attorneys to prepare
other witnesses to testify. In SEC v. Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021,
No. 97 Civ. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997), the court found that
this amounted to an attempt to depose the attorney for the other
side, because even if a non-attorney witness were designated, they
would have to have been prepared by those who conducted the in-
vestigation, and that preparation would include disclosure of SEC
attorneys' legal and factual theories. The court's comments in Ro-
senfeld are applicable here: "Although defendant is correct that a
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Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not required to have firsthand knowledge,
and that discovery should be conducted as efficiently as possible,
the notice of deposition clearly calls for the revealing of informa-
tion gathered by the SEC attorneys in anticipation of bringing the
instant enforcement proceedings, and if forced to designate wit-
nesses to testify fully and completely concerning the matters de-
scribed in the notice of deposition, testimony of SEC attorneys or
examiners working under the direction of the SEC attorneys con-
ducting the investigation would be necessary.,
65
As a result, designations which seek to inquire into one party's res-
ponses to the others' interrogatories and requests for production have been
found to be not only overbroad, but violative of the corporation's work prod-
uct privilege, especially since "answering requests for production and inter-
rogatories customarily is performed with the assistance of counsel."66
In an effort to balance one party's right to permissible discovery with
another's work product protections, many federal courts have focused on the
subject matter of the proposed inquiry, trying to draw the line between
"facts" and the "significance" of those facts:
There is simply nothing wrong with asking for facts from a
deponent even though those facts may have been communicated to
the deponent by the deponent's counsel. But, depending upon how
questions are phrased to the witness, deposition questions may
tend to elicit the impressions of counsel about the relative signific-
ance of the facts; opposing counsel is not entitled to his adversa-
ries' thought processes. Here the effort must be to protect against
indirect disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions or theories
of the case.
The problem in this type of situation is determining the degree
to which a particular deposition question elicits the mental impres-
sions of the attorney who communicated a fact to the deponent.
67
Where the courts have found that the designations improperly impinge
on the corporation's work product and attorney client privileges, they have
65. Id. at 444 (quoting Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021, at *2) (citation omitted).
66. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98C3952, 2000 WL 116082, at *9
(N.D. I11. Jan. 24, 2000) (mem.).
67. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. at 446 (quoting Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Com-
monwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 280 (D. Neb. 1989)).
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often struck the notice and instead directed the party to propound contention
interrogatories.68
In the same vein, it seems incongruous that a designee can be compelled
to testify about the corporation's subjective beliefs and opinions but that the
same questions could not be asked to a lay witness. 69 There is no overriding
policy reason or legal rationale for treating corporate representative deposi-
tions different from individual party depositions. Therefore, to the extent
possible, corporate representative's depositions should be governed by the
same rules and limitations as individual party depositions.
I. DESIGNATION OF AREAS
A. The "Reasonable Particularity" Requirement
Both the federal and state rules require that the areas of inquiry be des-
ignated in the notice with "reasonable particularity" 70 but do not otherwise
provide guidance as to the degree of specificity required.71 Unfortunately,
the cases construing the rules fail to offer any meaningful general rule and
instead are limited to their specific facts.
In one case, a Rule 30(b)(6) notice, which stated "that the areas of in-
quiry will 'includ[e] but not [be] limited to' the areas specifically enume-
rated," was held to be overbroad and therefore failed to meet the reasonable
particularity standard.72 In another case, the district court held that a notice
which sought "to examine 'such other officers and employees of said plain-
68. See, e.g., id.; Smithkline, 2000 WL 116082, at *9; Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 597, 602-03 (Fed. Cl. 1999); Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021, at *3-4.
69. See Exxon Research & Eng 'g Co., 44 Fed. CI. at 602-03.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10(b)(6). The reason for the particularity
requirement "is to give the opposing party notice of the areas of inquiry that will be pursued
so that it can identify appropriate deponents and ensure they are prepared for the deposition."
Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005).
71. The ABA's Civil Discovery Standards provide that the notice "should accurately and
concisely identify the designated area(s) of requested testimony, giving due regard to the
nature, business, size, and complexity of the entity being asked to testify." ABA SECTION OF
LITIG., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, § 19a (2004) available at http://www.abanet.org
/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL DISCOVERY
STANDARDS]. The ABA also suggests that if a party is in doubt as to "the meaning and intent
of any designated area of inquiry [it] should communicate in a timely manner with the request-
ing party to clarify the matter so that the deposition may go forward as scheduled." Id. § 19e.
72. Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000); accord Tri-State Hosp. Supply
Corp., 226 F.R.D. at 125 (striking the phrase "including but not limited to" from six categories
in a 30(b)(6) notice because "[l]isting several categories and stating that the inquiry may ex-
tend beyond the enumerated topics defeats the purpose of having any topics at all").
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tiff as have knowledge of the matters involved in this action"' was too gener-
al.7 3 Similarly, a designation regarding Plaintiff s "'responses to Defendants'
Interrogatories and requests for production, along with the subject[] [matters]
identified therein,"' was held to be not only overbroad and burdensome, but
violative of the corporation's work product privilege as well.74
In contrast, another federal district court held that a 30(b)(6) notice
identifying the subject matter as "[t]he Group Health Insurance Plan issued
to plaintiff through his employment with Xerox, Inc., believed to be num-
bered E9387," was stated with reasonable particularity. 75 Likewise, an in-
sured's 30(b)(6) notice, seeking "a person knowledgeable about the claims
processing and claims records, and persons familiar with general file keep-
ing, storage and retrieval systems of [the] defendant" insurer, was held to be
sufficiently particular.76 Most cases have held, however, that designations
which are overly broad or general, such as "all of the issues raised in plain-
tiffs complaint," may raise work product issues as well.77
B. What Constitutes Sufficient Compliance with the Notice?
Sanctions for failure to comply with both the state and federal rules are
dependent in the first instance upon the discovering party's compliance with
the procedures set forth in the rules.78 Where the party seeking the discovery
does not properly comply with the provisions of the rules, such as by naming
a specific individual,79 or by inadequately delineating the areas of inquiry,8°
or by failing to serve a formal notice,81 sanctions for failing to produce a
73. Morrison Exp. Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
74. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98C3952, 2000 WL 116082, at *9-
10 (N.D. I11. Jan. 24, 2000) (mem.).
75. Steil v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Kan. 2000).
76. Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 125-26 (M.D.N.C. 1989); see
also Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 137, 140 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that a Rule 30(b)(6) no-
tice which stated "that the subject matter of [the] inquiry will be 'the computer systems com-
monly known as or referred to as "Big Brother" and/or "WHODB,' .... was stated with "rea-
sonable particularity").
77. See supra Section II.B.
78. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, § 3.
79. See Anderson Invs. Co. v. Lynch, 540 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(per curiam) (holding that a corporation is not subject to sanctions for failing to produce a
specifically named employee in response to notice under Florida rule).
80. See King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (finding
that a corporate party may not be sanctioned for a representative's inability to answer ques-
tions outside the designated areas).
81. Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 145-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that plaintiff could not be sanctioned for violating Rule 30(b)(6) by
[Vol. 33
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/4
CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE DEPOSITIONS
knowledgeable corporate representative are generally not appropriate.82 As
stated rather unceremoniously by the court in King I, "if the deponent does
not know the answer to questions outside the scope of the matters described
in the notice, then that is the examining party's problem.,
83
Where the proper procedures are followed, however, the failure to pro-
duce individuals with sufficient knowledge of the matters asserted 84 can lead
to a variety of sanctions, which normally become progressively more severe
as noncompliance continues. 85  Typically, the court's first reaction to the
failure to provide a witness with sufficient knowledge of the designated mat-is t entr an86ters is to enter an order compelling production, sometimes even identifying
the specific individual(s) to appear.87 The types of escalating sanctions that
can follow are documented in Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe.88
producing purportedly inadequate witnesses when defendants' informal requests for deposi-
tion witnesses did not constitute "notice" under the rule).
82. See, e.g., id.; King I, 161 F.R.D. at 476; Lynch, 540 So. 2d at 833. A party must be
careful though not to sit on its rights and then try to justify its designation of a plainly unquali-
fied deponent. For example, in Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Injection Research Specialists, Inc., the
district court sanctioned the plaintiff for designating an unqualified deponent even though
plaintiff contended that its faulty designation was caused "by the vagueness of the [defen-
dant's] Deposition Notice." 210 F.R.D. 680, 682-84 (D. Minn. 2002). The court disagreed
with the plaintiff since it "voiced no uncertainty to [the defendant], after [it] amended its De-
position Notice, about the intended scope of inquiry, nor did it seek the assistance of the Court
in bringing further clarity to [the] scope of [the] questioning." Id. at 683; see also Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3,
2006) (suggesting that objections to the areas of inquiry must be made and ruled upon prior to
the commencement of the deposition).
83. King 1, 161 F.R.D. at 476.
84. The inadequate designation of a corporate employee for deposition, or even the fail-
ure to appear for the deposition, is sometimes considered tantamount "to a refusal or failure to
answer a deposition question." Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126
(M.D.N.C. 1989); see also Barron v. Caterpillar, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
But see Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 137, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that designee's
inability to answer all deposition questions was not "tantamount to a failure to appear" be-
cause designee "testified adequately in numerous respects" and "generally provided the name
of the person that could answer" the questions).
85. See, e.g., Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 804 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002). There is some authority supporting the proposition that "[b]oth in pre-
paring and in responding to a notice," the corporation or designated "witness is expected to
interpret the designated area(s) of inquiry in a reasonable manner consistent with the entity's
business and operations." CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, at § 19d.
86. See, e.g., Chiquita Int'l Ltd. v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.V., 705 So. 2d 112, 113
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam); Medero v. FPL, 658 So. 2d 566, 567-68 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
87. See Precision Tune, 804 So. 2d at 1288.
88. Id. at 1287, 1290-91.
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In Precision Tune, the plaintiff noticed the deposition of the foreign de-
fendant's corporate representative in Florida.89 Although the defendant filed
a motion for protective order, it never set it down for a hearing.90 Subse-
quently, the court granted the plaintiff's ensuing motion for sanctions and
required the corporate defendant to produce an employee for deposition in
Florida.91 Although the corporation produced an employee in response to the
order, the witness had only "very limited knowledge of the case, but identi-
fied three others with knowledge in the requested areas." 92  The plaintiff
"again moved for sanctions, which the court granted" and ordered the defen-
dant to produce the three named individuals for deposition in Florida, in ad-
dition to various specific documents by a specified date or its pleadings
would be stricken.93 The corporate defendant subsequently provided two of
the three employees, but failed to produce the documents or the third wit-
ness.94 Following a hearing, the court concluded that the corporation's con-
duct had demonstrated "'deliberate and contumacious disregard of the
Court's previous orders,"' and struck the defendant's pleadings.95 The trial
court's action was subsequently affirmed on appeal.96
The federal courts have taken a much stricter approach with respect to
compliance with the corporate representative rule than their Florida state
counterparts. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Southern Union Co.,97 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a corporation's failure to produce a
sufficiently knowledgeable representative was the equivalent of producing no
representative; in upholding an award of fees and costs in the absence of a
prior court order, the court stated:
When a corporation or association designates a person to testify on
its behalf, the corporation appears vicariously through that agent.
89. Id. at 1289.
90. Id. The defendant's initial objection appears to have been well taken, since the gener-
al rule recognized in Florida is that absent extraordinary circumstances, a non-resident em-
ployee of a foreign corporation, which is not seeking affirmative relief, cannot be compelled
to come to Florida for deposition. See, e.g., Prevost Car, Inc. v. Vehicles-R-Us, Inc., 658 So.
2d 668, 668 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Although not discussed by the appellate court, it
appears as if the defendant's failure to notice its own motion for hearing was treated by the
trial court as a waiver of its fight to insist upon requiring the plaintiff to come to its principal





95. Precision Tune, 804 So. 2d at 1290.
96. Id. at 1293.
97. 985 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1993).
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If that agent is not knowledgeable about relevant facts, and the
principal has failed to designate an available, knowledgeable, and
readily identifiable witness, then the appearance is, for all practical
purposes, no appearance at all.9 8
The next logical question is what happens when the corporate repre-
sentative does not know the answer to a question or series of questions.
Rule 30(b)(6) implicitly requires the designated representative
"to review all matters known or reasonably available to it in prepa-
ration for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. This interpretation is ne-
cessary in order to make the deposition a meaningful one and to
prevent the sandbagging of an opponent by conducting a half-
hearted inquiry before the deposition but a thorough and vigorous
one before the trial....
[A party] does not fulfill its obligations at the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition by stating it has no knowledge or position with respect
to a set of facts or area of inquiry within its knowledge or reasona-
bly available." 99
But the question then becomes to what lengths must a corporate repre-
sentative conduct research in order to competently testify as to the designated
areas. Courts appear to apply a reasonableness standard, requiring the corpo-
ration to "'prepare the designee to the extent matters are reasonably availa-
ble, whether from documents, past employees, or other sources.1'1 00 "Rea-
sonably available" has been defined to mean those documents that are in a
party's control.'0 ' "[lit need not make extreme efforts to obtain all informa-
tion possibly relevant to the requests."' 10 2 Courts have enforced this interpre-
tation "in order to make the deposition a meaningful one and to prevent the
'sandbagging' of an opponent by conducting a half-hearted inquiry before
the deposition but a thorough and vigorous one before... trial.' ' 3
98. Id. at 197.
99. Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 638 (D. Kan. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 362 (M.D.N.C. 1996)).
100. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18-
19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank
Tanzania, Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
101. See Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. S.P.A. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 38-39
(D. Mass. 2001). For example, a corporate representative was held obligated to review tax-
related documents in the possession of a non-employee accountant. See id. at 39.
102. In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-02-1486 CW, 2007 WL 219857, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007). Likewise, "the rule may not require absolute perfection in prepara-
tion." Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 528 (D. Md. 2005).
103. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 362.
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At the bare minimum, a corporation must prepare its representatives "by
having them review prior fact witness deposition testimony as well as docu-
ments and deposition exhibits, . . . [so it] can state its corporate position at
the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition [about] . . . prior deposition testimony."' 4 At
least one case has gone so far as to hold that the corporate representative
must also review all corporate documentation that might have a bearing on
the 30(b)(6) deposition topics, "[e]ven if the documents are voluminous and
the review of those documents would be burdensome."' 0 5 In short,
[w]hile the rule may not require absolute perfection in preparation.
. it nevertheless... requires a good faith effort on the party of the
designate to find out the relevant facts-to collect information, re-
view documents, and interview employees with personal know-
ledge just as a corporate party is expected to do in answering inter-
rogatories.
1°6
"There is no obligation to produce witnesses who know every single fact,
only those that are relevant and material to the incident or incidents that un-
derlie the suit.'
0 7
Although the length of time involved in preparation will not be deter-
minative of whether the corporation has reasonably prepared its deponent,
courts do consider it. 0 8 In one case, the court found that a corporate repre-
sentative failed to "appear" when the deponent spent a total of three hours
reviewing materials, merely glancing at some; conducted no investigation
into the corporation's role in the case; and spent a "scant" one and one-half
hours meeting with the corporate attorney prior to the deposition.0 9
In light of the above, some courts consider the production of an unpre-
pared designee to be "tantamount to [the] failure to appear" at a deposition.' 0
"[I]f it becomes obvious during the course of a deposition that the designee is
deficient, the corporation ...[must] provide a substitute.""' In addition,
"'[m]onetary sanctions are mandatory under Rule 37(d) for [the] failure to
appear by means of ... failing to [adequately] educate a Rule 30(b)(6) wit-
104. Id.
105. Calzaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 37.
106. Wilson, 228 F.R.D. at 528-29.
107. Id. at 529 n.7.
108. See id. at 528.
109. See Calzaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 37.
110. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
111. Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70,75 (D. Neb. 1995).
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ness, unless the conduct was substantially justified.""' 2 The rule provides
that a "court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that
party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure."' 13 In some cases where there is a repeated violation of
the rule, courts have held the corporation bound to the initial level of the
response and have precluded any later contradiction or supplementation."l
4
IV. SELECTION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVES
A. The Importance of the Selection
Before 1970, it was generally held that if a corporation was to be ex-
amined through its officers, directors, and managing agents, the individual to
be questioned had to be identified in the notice."5 Now that the corporation
selects the witnesses to testify as corporate representatives, this has become
an extremely important decision for two reasons.
First, since the deposition will be treated at trial as the testimony of a
party and not just an independent witness, the deposition may be used at trial
"for any purpose.""' 6 This means that the deposition may be read at trial and
offered as substantive evidence, regardless of the availability of the witness
to testify in person."
7
Second, and most obviously, the corporate party is bound by testimony
of the corporate representative, and the representative's statements can be
admitted as an admission of the corporation. 18 In other words, "[a] corpora-
tion is 'bound' by its Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, in the same sense that any
individual deposed under Rule 30(b)(1) would be 'bound' by his or her tes-
timony, however, this does not mean that the witness has made a judicial
admission that formally and finally decides an issue. ' '119
112. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d
479, 489 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 168, 174 (D.D.C.
2003)).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3).
114. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.330(a)(2).
117. See, e.g., LaTorre v. First Baptist Church of Ojus, Inc., 498 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
118. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 185 F.R.D. 70, 79 (D.D.C. 1999).
119. Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98-C-0509, 2001 WL 817853, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2001) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90-C-5383, 1991
WL 211647, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1991)).
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Accordingly, a corporation should be careful not to choose a representa-
tive whose testimony will contradict other testimony offered on behalf of the
corporation.12° The situation would probably be likened to a party who alters
its deposition testimony in order to create a genuine issue of material fact to
preclude the entry of summary judgment. "'When a party has given clear
answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any ge-
nuine issue of material fact [for summary judgment], that party cannot the-
reafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts without
explanation, previously given clear testimony.""90
2
'
B. The Knowledge Base of the Representative(s)
The testimony elicited at [a corporate representative's] deposi-
tion represents the knowledge of the corporation, not of the indi-
vidual deponents. The designated witness is "speaking for the
corporation," and this testimony must be distinguished from that of
a "mere corporate employee" whose deposition is not considered
that of the corporation and whose presence must be obtained by
subpoena. 122
Under both the state and federal rules, the corporate representative has a
duty to provide information that is "'known or reasonably available to the"'
corporation. 23 As such, "the duty to present and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6)
designee goes beyond matters personally known to that designee or to mat-
ters in which that designee was personally involved."'2 4 For this reason, the
120. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361-62 (M.D.N.C. 1996). As stated by
one court:
The designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an individual represents him or her-
self at a deposition. Were it otherwise, a corporation would be able to deceitfully select at trial
the most convenient answer presented by a number of finger-pointing witnesses at the deposi-
tions. Truth would suffer.... The attorney for the corporation is not at liberty to manufacture
the corporation's contentions. Rather, the corporation may designate a person to speak on its
behalf and it is this position which the attorney must advocate.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
121. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2003)(per
curiam) (quoting Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.
1984)).
122. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361. See also lerardi v. Loillard, Inc., No. 90-7049, 1991 WL
158911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 1991)(mem.).
123. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 360 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)).
124. Id. at 361 (citing Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 338, 343
(N.D. Ill. 1995); SEC v. Morelli, 143 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
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corporate representative does not need to have "personal knowledge of the
facts to which he testifies. ' 25
The corporation "must make a conscientious good-faith [effort] to de-
signate the person[] [who has] knowledge [about] the matters sought by" the
party noticing the deposition. 12 6 But the corporation's "duty extends beyond
the mere act of presenting a human body to speak on the corporation's be-
half." 127 Therefore, the corporation is not relieved of producing a representa-
tive simply because it has no employee who participated in the underlying
event or transaction or who "has sufficient [personal] knowledge to provide
the requested information.' 28 In such situations, a number of district court
decisions have held that the corporation must make a good faith effort to
prepare the representative to answer fully and completely any questions
posed as to the relevant subject matters based on any reasonably available
information including documents, past employees, or other sources. 129 It
may not be enough for the representative to simply review documents pre-
viously produced in deposition and to confer with the corporation's attorney
if this will not sufficiently prepare him to testify as to the designated areas.
130
The corporation's duty to provide information through a knowledgeable
representative has been equated to its obligations in answering interrogato-
ries:
The Advisory Committee said: "This burden is not essentially dif-
ferent from that of answering interrogatories under Rule 33 ...."
As with interrogatories, depositions should be answered directly
and without evasion, in accordance with the information the de-
posed party possesses, after due inquiry. [The corporation] must
make a conscientious good-faith endeavor to designate the persons
having knowledge of the matters sought by [the noticing party] and
to prepare those persons in order that they can answer fully, com-
125. PPM Fin., Inc. v. Norandal USA, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1085-86 (N.D. I11.
2004).
126. Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 67 (D.P.R. 1981); see also
Buycks-Roberson, 162 F.R.D. at 342.
127. Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D.
Fla. 1999).
128. Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995); see also
Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361-62; Morelli, 143 F.R.D. at 45; Mitsui, 93 F.R.D. at 67.
129. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510 at
*14, 18-19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006); Buycks-Roberson, 162 F.R.D. at 343; Dravo, 164 F.R.D.
at 75; United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 162 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D. Mass. 1995) (cases
cited therein); Morelli, 143 F.R.D. at 45; CrViL DISCOvERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, §
19(f).
130. See Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 638 (D. Kan. 1999).
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pletely, unevasively, the questions posed by Mitsui as to the rele-
vant subject matters.' 31
As previously discussed in more detail in Part H.B., a number of federal
district courts have limited inquiry under Rule 30(b)(6) to factual matters in
order to avoid allowing litigants to use the rule to circumvent a corporation's
work product protections. 32 There is, however, a line of federal district opi-
nions which state that the corporate representative "must not only testify
about facts within the corporation's knowledge, but also its subjective beliefs
and opinions" and its "interpretation of documents and events."1 33 In Lapen-
na v. Upjohn Co.,134 the court qualified this requirement by stating: "Before
compelling such a witness to testify regarding the subjective beliefs of the
corporation, a court should first be satisfied that the employee has the requi-
site knowledge and authority to make an accurate statement."'
' 35
Unfortunately, these cases do little to explain how a corporation can
have a "subjective belief," much less give any clue as to how it could ever be
determined. Is the subjective belief of the corporation the belief of its CEO?
How about a majority of its directors? Its stockholders? Its attorneys?
Perhaps even more importantly, such a requirement creates a very high
risk of violating a corporation's work product privilege. 136 It is one thing to
require a corporate representative to testify about factual matters, but quite
another to require testimony about conclusions and interpretations which
clearly enter the realm of the attorney's mental impressions, strategy, advice,
and legal conclusions.
While many of these courts have given lip-service to the proposition
that "[t]he designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an individ-
ual represents [himself], 13 7 these courts, in fact, hold the corporation to a
much higher standard. 38 Although an individual is not required to speculate
131. Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 66-67 (D.P.R. 1981) (citations
omitted).
132. See, e.g., Morelli, 143 F.R.D at 47.
133. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *19
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006); United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (rely-
ing on Lapenna v. Upjohn Co., 110 F.R.D. 15, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1986)); see also A.I.A. Holdings,
S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97-CIV-4978, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002);
lerardi v. Lorillard, Inc., No. 90-7049, 1991 WL 158911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13,
1991)(mem.) (opposing party entitled to discover corporation's "interpretation" of docu-
ments).
134. Lapenna, 110 F.R.D. at 15.
135. Id. at 20.
136. See id. at 21-22.
137. A.LA. Holdings, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2.
138. See generally United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
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as to matters of which he or she has no direct knowledge, these cases require
the representative to testify as to matters of which the corporation itself may
have no knowledge.' Similarly, while an individual would not be required
to give expert opinions in areas where he or she is not an expert, this line of
cases in effect requires the corporation to do so by compelling the representa-
tive to testify concerning the corporation's "subjective beliefs and opi-
nions."' 4 Since an individual litigant would not be required to divulge opi-
nion work product or speculate as to expert opinions, why should a corpora-
tion be required to do so?
C. The Knowledge Level of the Representative(s)
A common misconception among litigants, and sometimes even
courts, 41 is that the rules require the production of the person with the
"most" knowledge regarding the designated issues. 142 Neither the state nor
federal rule contains such a requirement, and instead only provide that the
witness be able to "testify about matters known or reasonably available to the
organization."'
143
Both the state and federal rules clearly call for the selection of the wit-
ness to be made by the corporation.'" The party seeking to take the deposi-
tion may not name a particular employee or individual under this rule.145 To
require the corporation to produce the individual with the "most" knowledge
of a designated issue, however, would nullify the corporation's choice in the
matter and, in many cases, would be tantamount to requiring the production
of a specific employee.
46
For example, if the case involved a suit for personal injuries arising
from an accident, those corporate employees with the "most" knowledge of
139. Seeid.at361.
140. Id.; see also Lapenna, 110 F.R.D. at 20; A.LA. Holdings, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2.
141. See Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 729-30 (D.
Mass. 1985).
It makes no sense for a party to state in a notice that it wishes to examine a representative of a
corporation on certain matters, have the corporation designate the person most knowledgeable
with respect to those matters, and then to ask the representative about matters totally different
from the ones listed in the notice.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id.
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6); see also King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D.
475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
144. See Chiquita Int'l Ltd. v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.V., 705 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 112-13.
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how the accident occurred would be the ones who actually witnessed it. The
same could be true in a products liability suit; the employee with the "most"
knowledge concerning the operation of the product would likely be the engi-
neer who designed it. In these cases, the corporation would therefore be de-
prived of its right to make a selection of the representative to speak for it as
guaranteed by the rule.
Such a construction would pose other problems. If, for instance, the ac-
cident in the first example occurred on a cruise ship sailing in the Mediterra-
nean Sea, the crew members who witnessed it would likely reside and work
in Europe. Similarly, if the product in the second example was manufactured
in Japan, the engineer who designed it would likely live and work in Asia.
To require their employers to bring them to Florida, as the witnesses with the
"most" knowledge, would violate the well-established rule that witnesses
who work and reside outside of the state cannot be required to come to the
state for a deposition.147
It is also important to note that under both the state and federal rules, the
corporation, or other organization is not limited to designating an officer,
director, or managing agent, but may also select anyone who consents to act
as a corporate representative, which may include an employee, attorney, or
consultant. 48 An individual may decline to appear as a corporate representa-
tive, particularly if they have an independent interest from, or conflicting
interest with, the corporation in the pending litigation. 149
Finally, if there is no single individual that can offer testimony on each
of the designated areas, the corporation is obligated to produce as many rep-
resentatives as necessary to satisfy the request. 5 °
D. The Corporation's Use of the Rule to Avoid Harassment
While the state and federal rules provide an important tool for the liti-
gant seeking to depose a corporation, they may help corporations reduce ha-
rassment in the form of having to produce excessive numbers of corporate
147. See, e.g., United Teachers Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Vanwinkle, 657 So. 2d 1232, 1232-33
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
148. FED. R. Crv. P. 30 advisory committee's note, subdivision (b)(6) (1970) (explaining
that a person who is not an officer, director, or managing agent may be designated to testify
only with their consent).
149. See id.
150. See Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Group, Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 1999); Cont'l
Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CAO4-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18 (S.D. Ala. Mar.
3, 2006) ("[A] corporation served with a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition has a duty to 'pro-
duce such number of persons as will satisfy the request."'); Quantachrome Corp. v. Microme-
ritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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employees for deposition. In Plantation-Simon, Inc. v. Bahloul,151 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal concluded that while a party seeking to depose cor-
porate employees was not required to use Rule 1.3 10(b)(6) and could instead
set the depositions of specific employees as provided elsewhere in the Flori-
da Rules of Civil Procedure, "if the trial court finds that seriatim depositions
of corporate officers has created a burden on the corporate party, the court is
empowered to alleviate that burden in a proper case by, e.g., limiting the
examining party to the designation procedure.0
52
Where, however, a corporate officer or employee has specific additional
personal knowledge of matters in controversy, it is erroneous to prevent the
opposing party from deposing such a witness. 153 Likewise, a corporation
may insist on the designation of a corporate representative as an alternative
to deposing high-ranking corporate officers who possess no unique, superior,
personal knowledge of the matter in issue.
154
A 30(b)(6) deposition may not be justified where, assuming
the witness is properly prepared, the entity establishes that the wit-
ness's testimony as a 30(b)(6) witness would be identical to his
testimony as an individual and the 30(b)(6) is limited, or substan-
tially limited, to topics covered in the deposition taken in the wit-
ness's individual capacity. In such a situation, there appears to be
no obstacle to the entity's complying with its obligations under
Rule 30(b)(6) by adopting the witness's testimony in his individual
capacity.'55
V. THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE'S TESTIMONY
A. Changing Testimony Through Errata Sheets
As with most other aspects of corporate representative depositions,
there is scant law dealing with the subject of what changes can be made in
the transcript after the deposition is completed. Even resort to the rules ap-
plicable to depositions, in general, offers little help. Although the federal
151. 596 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Id. at ll61.
153. See, e.g., Medero v. FPL, 658 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curiam).
154. See, e.g., Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Baine v.
GMC, 141 F.R.D. 332, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
155. A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97-CIV-4978-LMMHBP, 2002 WL
1041356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002).
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and state rules are worded somewhat differently, they both provide depo-
nents with the opportunity to review the transcript after it is completed and to
make "changes in form or substance" on a written signed statement, which
also must set forth the reasons given by the deponent for each change. 56
Despite the similarity of their respective rules, Florida and federal courts
have interpreted their rules differently. 57
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(e) provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny changes in form or substance that the witness wants to make [to the
transcript] shall be listed in writing by the officer with a statement of the
reasons given by the witness for making the changes.' 5 8 As is clear from the
language of the rule, a "deponent can make changes of any nature [to the
transcribed deposition,] no matter how fundamental or substantial.' 59
If, however, the changes are substantial the opposing party can reopen a
deposition to inquire about the changes. 160 While a party may inquire as to
whether the substantive changes originated with the deponent or his attorney,
the attorney-client privilege precludes inquiry into the substance of the com-
munications between the deponent and his or her counsel.' 6' The errata
sheet, indicating the changes and corrections to the witness's deposition tes-
timony, is admissible in evidence since it becomes a part of the testimony. 62
While earlier interpretations of the federal rule allowed a deponent to
make any change whatsoever to the deposition transcript, recent decisions,
including cases in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have limited the
changes to matters of form and not the substance of the testimony given un-
der oath.'63
156. FED. R. Cry. P. 30(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(e).
157. See Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992). But see
Feltner v. Internationale Nederlanden Bank, 622 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (per curiam).
158. FLA.R.CIv.P. 1.310(e).
159. Feltner, 622 So. 2d at 124; see also Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
160. See Motel 6, Inc. v. Dowling, 595 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
161. Feltner, 622 So. 2d at 125.
162. Dowling, 595 So. 2d at 262.
163. See Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992); see also
Bums v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Jackson County, 330 F.3d 1275, 1281-82 (10th Cir.
2003); Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) ("We do not
condone counsel's allowing for material changes to deposition testimony and certainly do not
approve of the use of such altered testimony that is controverted by the original testimony.");
Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000); Harrell v. Wood &
Assoc. of Am. (In re Harrell), 351 B.R. 221, 240 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); Reynolds v. IBM
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004), aft'd, 125 F. App'x 982 (11 th Cir. 2004)
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The rationale for these more restrictive interpretations of Rule 30(e) was
set forth in the oft-quoted Greenway v. International Paper Co.: 6
The purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious. Should the reporter
make a substantive error, i.e., he reported "yes" but I said "no," or
a formal error, i.e., he reported the name to be "Lawrence Smith"
but the proper name is "Laurence Smith," then corrections by the
deponent would be in order. The Rule cannot be interpreted to al-
low one to alter what was said under oath. If that were the case,
one could merely answer the questions with no thought at all then
return home and plan artful responses. Depositions differ from in-
terrogatories in that regard. A deposition is not a take home ex-
amination. 165
In Greenway, a plaintiff sought to make sixty-four corrections to her
deposition testimony. 66 The majority of the changes, indicated on the plain-
tiff s errata sheet, sought to materially alter the testimony given at deposi-
tion. 67 The reasons given for the changes were "(1) [the plaintiff's] belief
that the correction is a more accurate and complete answer or (2) that she
subsequently recalled more accurate information or (3) that she wished to
clarify her answer."
16 8
Cases from both the United States Middle District Court of Florida and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have followed the more recent inter-
pretation of Rule 30 and disallowed substantive changes to depositions.' 69 In
Reynolds v. IBM Corp.,'70 a former IBM employee sued the company, assert-
ing that he was fired because of discrimination.' 7' The plaintiff alleged that
after he sent an e-mail to a supervisor on February 27, 2001 requesting in-
formation about medical leave, the company set up a March 6, 2001 meeting
(unpublished table decision); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless L.L.C., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535-36
(D.D.C. 1994) ("Defendant Gerstner argues that Rule 30(e) allows her to make any substan-
tive change she so desires. While older cases appear to support this position, later cases have
often limited this blank check; perhaps because of the potential for abuse.") (footnote omit-
ted); Rios v. Bigler, 847 F. Supp. 1538, 1546-47 (D. Kans. 1994) ("The court will only con-
sider those changes which clarify the deposition, and not those which materially alter the
deposition testimony as a whole.").
164. 144 F.R.D. at 322.
165. Id. at 325.
166. Id. at 323.
167. See id. 323-25.
168. Id. at 325.
169. See, e.g., Reynolds v. IBM Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2004),
aff'd, 125 F. App'x 982 (11 th Cir. 2004) (unpublished table decision).
170. Id. at 1290.
171. Id. at 1298.
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with him to discuss either his resignation or placement in a performance im-
provement plan.'72 In his deposition, though, the plaintiff stated that the
meeting was actually scheduled two to three weeks before he had requested
information about medical leave. 73 This testimony refuted the plaintiffs
contention that the meeting was set up in response to his e-mail, since the
meeting was clearly set up prior to the e-mail.'74 Realizing that his testimony
destroyed his case, the plaintiff attempted to submit an errata sheet changing
"'two to three weeks' to 'a little before the meeting,' and indicated [that] he
could not recall if [his supervisor] called him 'a week or a few days before'
the March 6, 2001 meeting."'' 75  The plaintiffs reason given for these
changes was "confusion.'
176
The court disallowed the plaintiffs changes, adopting the rule that subs-
tantive changes to deposition testimony are impermissible:
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have dealt with situations where a deponent filed an
errata sheet that materially changed original deposition testimony.
Both courts analogized the situation to the rule that an affidavit
may not be used to contradict a witness's prior sworn testimony. 77
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Reynolds decision 78 in an unpub-
lished opinion, which under its rules makes it persuasive, although not bind-
ing as precedent. 179
In Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc.,180 Judge Hill, in a dissent-
ing opinion, discussed the competing rules regarding changes to errata
sheets, noting that the rule followed in the Eleventh Circuit is that substan-
tive changes to a deposition are not permitted. 8' There, a district court sanc-
tioned a law firm over $400,000 "for their conduct in representing a Title VII
plaintiff in a sexual harassment lawsuit."'' 82 Originally, the district court "re-
ferr[ed] the issue of sanctions to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hear-
172. Id. at 1299-1300.
173. Id. at 1300.
174. Reynolds, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
175. Id. at 1300.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Reynolds v. IBM Corp., 125 F. App'x 982, 982 (11 th Cir. 2004) (unpublished table
decision).
179. ITH Cm. R. 36-2.
180. 457 F.3d 1180(11th Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 1220-21 (Hill, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1184 (majority opinion).
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ing," report, and recommendation.'83 One of the issues presented to the ma-
gistrate was whether the law firm's submission of an errata sheet to the plain-
tiffs deposition with over 868 changes to the plaintiffs testimony-
consisting of 1200 pages-showed that the law firm had brought the plain-
tiffs suit in bad faith and knew that the suit was totally baseless.184  Al-
though the magistrate judge found that the law firm had not acted improper-
ly, he further noted that the submission of the errata sheet was improper.1 85
The district court subsequently discarded the magistrate's findings and
"substituted its own findings of fact," entering sanctions without conducting
an evidentiary hearing.
186
In a two to one decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district
court had abused its discretion when it rejected the magistrate's findings and
entered an order of sanctions without a hearing of its own or the calling of a
single witness. 87 Although the majority did not address the propriety of the
errata sheet filed by the plaintiff, Judge Hill noted in his dissenting opinion:
"Although early cases may have given the impression that such [substantive]
changes are permissible, the rule is, and was at the time the Amlongs filed
the Errata Sheet, to the contrary."'
' 88
Even more recently, a Middle District bankruptcy court disregarded an
errata sheet that made substantive changes to a deposition, citing to both Am-
183. Id.
184. See id. at 1185-86.
185. Amlong & Amlong, 457 F.3d at 1200.
186. Id. at 1184.
187. Id. at 1202 n.6 ("Our holding.., is simply this: the district court abused its discre-
tion and clearly erred when it squarely rejected the magistrate judge's findings of fact and
credibility determinations and substituted its own, without hearing so much as a single witness
at a sanctions hearing.") (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 1220 (Hill, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Hill's dissenting opinion
also states:
The Amlongs maintain that Rule 30(e) "in no way limits the types and number of
changes" that an errata sheet is permitted to make to a prior deposition. The majority seems to
agree, noting without comment or objection that Norelus's sworn testimony was changed 868
times by the Errata Sheet.
Id. (footnote omitted). However, as Judge Hill points out, the majority in Amlong & Amlong
never ruled on the issue of whether errata sheets could be used to make substantive changes to
a deposition, instead they only noted that it was attempted below. Amlong & Amlong, 457
F.3d at 1200 (Hill, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Circuit also noted, without comment, that the
magistrate found the submission of the errata sheet to be improper, which based on the reason-
ing stated above, would instead support the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
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long and Reynolds as precedent in Harrell v. Wood & Associates of America,
Inc. (In re Harrell):' 89
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(e) permits a depo-
nent to modify or make corrections to a deposition for form or sub-
stance. However, while older case law has taken a broader view of
the rule, the modem trend, one that is bolstered by the Eleventh
Circuit, is to view Rule 30(e) with a restrictive eye. The Eleventh
Circuit recently broached the issue in Amlong & Amlong P.A. v.
Denny's, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (1lth Cir. 2006). The Amlong court
surveyed case law which articulated the narrow view of Rule
30(e). For example, in quoting Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144
F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit echoed that
"[a] deposition is not a take home examination."...
The Eleventh Circuit continued its analysis by stating a broad-
er interpretation of Rule 30(e) holds "potential for abuse." In addi-
tion, the Amlong court noted that the Eleventh Circuit itself had af-
firmed a district court's decision to disregard an errata sheet that
attempted to contradict a deposition when the deponent claimed
confusion at the deposition.
19
B. Conflicting Testimony
Another important issue that has not been fully addressed by either the
rules or the Florida state courts is whether a party is permitted to call other
witnesses at trial to refute or contradict the testimony of the corporate repre-
sentative.
Numerous federal district courts have repeated the standard: "[A] cor-
poration served with a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition has a duty to 'pro-
duce such number of persons as will satisfy the request [and] more impor-
tantly, prepare them so that they may give complete, knowledgeable and
binding answers on behalf of the corporation.""9 1
189. 351 B.R. 221, 240 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
190. Id. (citations omitted).
191. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006) (emphasis added) (citing Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125
F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989)); see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters.,
Inc., No. 01-CIV-3016(AGS)(HB), 2002 WL 1835439, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2002) ("A
30(b)(6) witness testifies as a representative of the entity, his answers bind the entity ....")
(emphasis added); Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000);
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The unanswered question, however, is what does "binding" mean in this
context? In a statement that has been repeated by a number of other cases,'92
the court in United States v. Taylor93 concluded:
The designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an in-
dividual represents him or herself at a deposition. Were it other-
wise, a corporation would be able to deceitfully select at trial the
most convenient answer presented by a number of finger-pointing
witnesses at the depositions. Truth would suffer.
... The attorney for the corporation is not at liberty to manu-
facture the corporation's contentions. Rather, the corporation may
designate a person to speak on its behalf and it is this position
which the attorney must advocate. 
194
Although the foregoing quote would appear to prevent the subsequent
introduction of contrary evidence, the court softened its stance on the conclu-
sive nature of such testimony in a footnote:
When the Court indicates that the Rule 30(b)(6) designee
gives a statement or opinion binding on the corporation, this does
not mean that said statement is tantamount to a judicial admission.
Rather, just as in the deposition of individuals, it is only a state-
ment of the corporate person which, if altered, may be explained
and explored through cross-examination as to why the opinion or
statement was altered. However, the designee can make admis-
sions against interest under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) which are
binding on the corporation. 1
95
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp.,196 cited in Taylor, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois went on to further
define the meaning of "binding" in this context by explaining:
It is true that a corporation is "bound" by its Rule 30(b)(6) testi-
mony, in the same sense that any individual deposed under Rule
30(b)(1) would be "bound" by his or her testimony. All this means
is that the witness has committed to a position at a particular point
192. See, e.g., A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros, No. 97-CIV-4978, 2002 WL
1041356, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002); Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 44 Fed.
CI. 597, 600 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
193. 166 F.R.D. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
194. Id. at 361-62 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 2002 WL 1835439, at *3.
195. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 362 n.6 (citations omitted).
196. No. 90-C-5383, 1991 WL 211647 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1991).
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in time. It does not mean that the witness has made a judicial ad-
mission that formally and finally decides an issue. Deposition tes-
timony is simply evidence, nothing more. Evidence may be ex-
plained or contradicted. Judicial admissions, on the other hand,
may not be contradicted. Viskase ignores the differences between
evidentiary testimony and judicial admissions.197
Other cases have gone further, however, indicating that courts could in
fact bar inconsistent testimony. 198 In Wilson v. Lakner,'99 the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland warned that: "[D]epending on the
nature and extent of the obfuscation, the testimony given by the non-
responsive deponent (e.g. 'I don't know') may be [designated] 'binding on
the corporation' so as to prohibit it from offering contrary evidence at tri-
al.,,Q00
Similarly, in Rainey v. American Forest & Paper Ass'n,20 1 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to allow a corporate
party to present evidence which conflicted with the testimony of its corporate
representative in opposition to a subsequent motion for summary judgment:
In light of this factual predicate, plaintiff reads Rule 30(b)(6)
as precluding defendant from adducing from Ms. Kurtz a theory of
the facts that differs from that articulated by the designated repre-
sentatives. Plaintiffs theory is consistent with both the letter and
spirit of Rule 30(b)(6). First, the Rule states plainly that persons
designated as corporate representatives "shall testify as to matters
known or reasonably available to the organization." This makes
clear that a designee is not simply testifying about matters within
his or her own personal knowledge, but rather is "speaking for the
corporation" about matters to which the corporation has reasonable
access. By commissioning the designee as the voice of the corpo-
ration, the Rule obligates a corporate party "to prepare its designee
to be able to give binding answers" in its behalf. Unless it can
prove that the information was not known or was inaccessible, a
197. Id. at *2 (citation omitted); see also A & E Prods. Group, L.P. v. Mainetti USA, Inc.,
No. 01 Civ. 10820 (RPP), 2004 WL 345841, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004).
198. See generally Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524 (D. Md. 2005); Rainey v. Am. For-
est & Paper Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 1998).
199. 228 F.R.D. at 524.
200. Id. at 530.
201. Rainey, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 82. In reaching this holding the court did not rely upon the
principle that a party cannot change its sworn testimony by a subsequent affidavit to defeat a
motion for summary judgment, but instead ruled squarely on its analysis of Rule 30(b)(6), so
that its holding would be equally applicable at trial. See id. at 102.
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corporation cannot later proffer new or different allegations that
could have been made at the time of the 30(b)(6) deposition.2 °2
VI. CONCLUSION
The varying interpretations of the respective state and federal rules go-
verning corporate representative depositions lead to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the rules need to provide better guidance on the noticing, prepara-
tion for, conduct of, and use of corporate representative depositions. Given
the potentially harsh sanctions for what courts may deem to be non-
compliance with the rules, the parties need clear parameters on how to pro-
ceed. The courts and the rules committees cannot take a wait-and-see ap-
proach because most of these issues never reach the appellate courts given
the stringent appellate requirements to obtain review of discovery matters.
When the rules committees decide to improve the rules, they should
carefully analyze and consider that, to the extent possible, corporate repre-
sentative depositions should be governed by the same rules and limitations as
individual party depositions with regard to work product, speculative testi-
mony, and the rendering of expert opinions. This will facilitate the process
of bringing the corporate representative rules into focus for litigants on both
sides of the bar, while at the same time, leveling the playing field so that
corporations are not unfairly penalized simply because they are corporations.
202. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
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